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<b>Remarks:</b> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100px; margin: 10px 0;"></div> <p>Attached are Colby's comments, questions, and suggestions on the prospectus for your paper on Arab leadership in the 1980's. With all this grist for your mill, I am refraining from giving you any of my own.</p> <p>My advice is to proceed with your paper with these comments in mind. Any of these not explicitly handled can be dealt with by a covering memo to the DCI when you are finished.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Ed</i> Ed Proctor</p>			
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
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Time, but let's  
make sure that  
economics is  
fully engaged in the  
analysis  
as it will be a  
major factor  
See scribbles -

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The Shape of the Arab World  
to 1980

I. Some Basic Thoughts

A. Even with the grave problems of getting an Israeli settlement and restoring sanity to the oil cartel, the US is now probably as well served by the rule of Sadat and Faisal as any two Arabs imaginable. Boumediene and Asad are junior partners in this firm of pragmatic, careful men.

B. They appear to be both leading and riding a tide of greater sobriety and more limited political objectives, both with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute and to relations between the Arab countries themselves. Successes would reinforce their positions at home and lead to others following their example; failures could lead to a stronger influence by someone like Qaddhafi.

C. US-Soviet actions and relations will continue to be of major importance to the Arab states. Sadat is temperamentally much more receptive to US overtures and wary of Russian ones than was Nasser. Faisal shares his view. But the USSR, the principal arms supplier of Egypt and Syria, will still play a leading role in Arab and other Middle Eastern developments -- as will the US.

7 — D. The internal control and long-range tenure of Sadat and Faisal seem fine on the surface -- but there is much in Arab society that we don't know about. The future course of Arab-Israeli relations will play a principal role in determining whether they succeed or fail.

## II. Introduction

The issue here is how to address the likely state of the Arab world -- its leaders both individuals and countries -- around the beginning of the 1980's. A straight projection of the trends we see today is very likely to be wrong in many respects; the area is now in the midst of change. This prospectus attempts to get at the basic factors in the situation and, hopefully, to assess how they affect those issues of importance to the United States.

Much of our thinking has been, over the years, conditioned by the developments of the 1950's and 1960's. The sense of common identity, which began to develop among Eastern Arabs some 50 years ago, blossomed into a strong political movement for Pan-Arab unity. The latter was fueled by a belief that the division of the former Ottoman territories among European states after World War I frustrated a natural condition of political unity. It came to be the driving force in the years after World War II, expressed by a Pan-Arab Party, the Baath, and a personality, Nasser. The unity movement peaked in the late 1950's and early 1960's with the short-lived United Republic of Egypt and Syria.

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Much has changed since then. Nasser is dead, the Baath Party is fractured, decades of independence have put most countries on separate tracks of political, social, and other development. There is no single focus of power and influence.

### III. Some Hypotheses

Arab unity in the sense that it was used in the 1950's is out of favor with Arabs in the Middle East. The notion of an all encompassing political unity of the Arab World is probably dead for a long time. No current king or president of an Arab state aspires to leadership of all Arabs, save for Libya's Qaddafi, and he has been pretty well discredited. Nor is there much serious talk or writing in political circles about unity. This hypothesis does not deny, however, that many individuals and states wish to wield influence and in some cases to exercise dominant influence over their immediate neighbors.

Certain Arab states are leaders in the area by virtue of indigenous qualities.

a. Egypt, largest in population and in military strength. Leader in cultural and artistic fields, e.g., movies, education, and literature.

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b. Saudi Arabia, for its oil reserves, great wealth, and ability to use these factors in many ways which affect other Arab states.

c. Algeria, more of a North African regional leader than an Arab world leader. It is reasonably well off, has a self-confident leadership and government and has tended to expend its energies and resources in practical, achievable ways, and not pick useless quarrels with its neighbors.

d. Syria, again a regional rather than an Arab world leader. Its interests have traditionally extended into Lebanon, Jordan, and into Palestine. Its current, relatively pragmatic leadership and its fighting record in the October 73 war have enhanced its status among other Arab states, but it is on bad terms, for example, with Iraq.

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e. We tentatively conclude that these states are the ones with which the United States will have to deal and worry about over the next half-dozen years. It is possible that examination will lead us to add one or two others to the list.

*Kuwait?  
etc*

The lesser states, i.e., the Yemens, Tunisia, Lebanon, Sudan, *Somalia* are not likely to be of primary concern to the United States and its interests in the area. These states are either followers of the more important ones listed above, or they are essentially concerned with their own interests. One must note that Morocco, Jordan, and Iraq fall somewhere between the two groups, but at this stage of our investigation we would place them in this lesser category.

There is very little that is predictable about the sort of leader who may succeed to power in any Arab country. In many states, such a successor is not identifiable since there is no orderly arrangement for succession. This is true for example in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. A successor is formally designated in a few states -- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt -- but even here his qualities are often unknown and unknowable until he comes into the top spot (Sadat surprised many people, both in Egypt and out of it). Further there is always the threat of revolutionary change which could bring a total unknown to

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the top. It is, however, possible in some countries to identify domestic political and social trends which are generally accepted and would be followed by almost any leader. These, however, are usually of less interest to the United States than the character of a leader and what he thinks about foreign affairs.

IV. A Crucial Distinction

We want to try to draw a distinction between the long-term factors in a country which will determine the thrust and direction of its institutions and policy for a period of decades, and the more changeable circumstances of the personality of a country's leader, or a particular military or economic circumstance which can directly affect US interests within the time-frame of this paper.

Syria, for example, has developed a one-Party government which has dramatically altered that country's domestic life in the past two decades. The system is likely to stay in being for quite a time, but the change in leadership four years ago which put a pragmatic and careful man in the place of a doctrinaire ideologue had considerable impact on US interests in the area. Much the same circumstances have prevailed in Algeria since Boumediene replaced Ben Bella. It is also possible to make this case for Egypt in the instance of Sadat after Nasser.

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V. Israel and the Palestine Issue

What happens within many Arab states will depend to a considerable degree on what happens in their dispute with the Israelis. There are a number of broad alternative lines of development in Arab-Israeli relations and within each one almost countless scenarios can be spun out. It is important that this study not get bogged down in a host of ifs and maybes, on the one hands, etc. But differing basic possibilities cannot be ignored either.

The following very general alternative courses of events would each be very formative of domestic and inter-Arab developments.

- a. *Slow but appreciable progress* towards a mutually acceptable Arab-Israeli modus vivendi. Tensions and uncertainty would remain as neither Arab nor Israeli demands are fully met, though both sides would continue to concede enough to avoid an explosion. If this comes to pass, things in such important states

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as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world as a whole have a good chance of going ahead without major change.

*toward what?*

- b. *Another Arab-Israeli war.* The chances seem fairly good that Israel would do better than last time. If so, the Arabs could be in, not just for another frustrating stalemate, but for public humiliation. Though this is an over simplification, Arab humiliation is normally a precipitant of drastic domestic change, or at least of uncertainty, unrest and tension. A Sadat discredited could mean a Sadat overthrown; his policies at home, in the Arab world, and internationally (including the US) could then be reversed. Arab oil interests would not be used or considered in manners other than as weapons against the US.

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- c. *War ending in stalemate*, but with the Arabs, as in October 1973, able to claim some real achievements and to maintain some image of credit, pride, and self-respect. Such an event, whether these Arab gains are small or even quite substantial, would reinforce the domestic positions of the present Arab leaders. The US position in the Near East world and its access to Arab oil would be threatened, at least for a time, however, because of its support of the Israelis.
- d. *An Arab-Israeli settlement* both mutually acceptable and showing promise of enduring. Provided that the Arab leaders did not become endangered by the inevitable charges of sell-out that their own extremists would make, their hold on power would be strengthened. So would US interests in the Arab world (or at least the threat to them would diminish).

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VI. Questions and Issues about Important Countries

A. Egypt

Sadat has drastically changed Egypt's image, its economic and social policies, its inter-Arab dealings, and its foreign alignment. *Why? How?*

a. Presumably he realized Nasser had achieved little at home or abroad in return for the resources expended. Setting one's sights on more realistic goals is a rational act.

b. There may have been a stronger demand for particularism as opposed to Pan-Arabism in Egypt and elsewhere than Nasser (and ourselves) realized. Implementing it in Egypt has made respectable what had been practiced generally in most other Arab countries.

c. Sadat has not abandoned his Arab leadership position, but he establishes prestige via tangible gains, e.g., the Yom Kippur war, even if his objectives are limited.

*Might he overreach in his attempt to dominate Saudi Arabia & generate a backlash which would unseat him (+ put in what?) -?*

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d. How popular is Sadat in Egypt now?

The evidence does not permit a confident answer, but there are few overt signs of dissent. But if he died, or decided his policies were failing, or someone like Ali Sabri overthrew him, would some momentum from his old policies be maintained? Or would there be a reversion to a 'Nasserite' policy? I.e., has Sadat misjudged Egypt by relying on the bourgeoisie rather than "the people?" As a tentative judgment, a new Nasser could establish himself and hold on, even were little tangible to be accomplished. Zealots continue to rule in Iraq and Libya, and the success of pragmatists in Algeria, Syria, Egypt cannot be entirely explained. But pressures for their style of "moderation" exist and will continue to press on all Arab leaders.

B. OAPEC and its money --

The Arab oil-producing states have enormous amounts of money, and their oil is vitally significant to the world.

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Secrets  
during?  
him  
With what  
result?*

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No personal leader dominates this group, though Saudi Arabia is clearly the most important country and its ruler commands a good deal of respect. Whether these countries will seek to use this power to forward their own political aims (as in the Arab-Israeli dispute), to adopt broad policies they view as economically desirable to them but inimical to their customers (as in raising prices and cutting production), or to adopt more cooperative ventures with the Western powers will remain one of the most important and difficult questions to answer. At least the factors impelling them pro and con in each instance can be spelled out.

a. Saudi Arabia is the critical one -- the biggest producer, with the most oil, the richest, now Sadat's good friend, and generally a force for Arab "pro-Western", "moderate" policies. But it is unable to go against broadly-held opinion in other states -- witness its change of heart on efforts to drive down oil prices. Its respected King Faisal is determined to get Jerusalem back and will

*Another embargo, & what results?*

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exert more pressure for this. The regime is peculiarly vulnerable, however, -- a tribal, theocratic monarchy in an age of change. Seizure, or even attempted seizure, of power there by extremists on the order of those ruling Libya or Iraq would have major regional and international repercussions. Formerly Egypt's enemy; would friendship save it in such a crisis? Is Iran a reliable guarantor of its security?

b. The "neutral" oil producers -- Kuwait, UAE, Oman -- interested in money not politics. Politically with Saudi Arabia. Algeria needs the money and has pushed Saudi Arabia to hold the oil price line.

c. Iraq and Libya are highly politically motivated; they are internally disrupted and externally disruptive. They don't have much area-wide influence, but they can make trouble.

C. Palestine

a. Only Iraq, Libya preach a pan-Arab anti-Israeli crusade now. The Saudis and

*Are not  
more  
of them  
ahead?*

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Egyptians support more limited but still tangible goals.

b. However unsuccessful as guerrillas, the fedayeen are clearly the established, somewhat independent leaders of the Palestinians.

c. New Palestinian leaders (important ones anyway) recognize this. PLO's approval of negotiating for a truncated Palestine is unprecedented, has caused a division.

d. If a new mini-Palestine is created as part of a limited or comprehensive settlement, the Arab-Israeli problem will ease absolutely for a time -- perhaps for a decade or more -- and is likely to become more a regional rather than a Pan-Arab or international problem.

D. Some Smaller States

1. Hussein and Jordan

a. Also a major actor with the Israelis and our closest Arab friend.

*Other alternatives?*

*Wait - I  
regenerate  
quickly as a  
demand for  
"more"?*

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He seems as strong as ever now;  
how would he fare in an Israeli-  
Palestinian deal?

b. What if he and Crown Prince  
Hassan were removed?

*Could he  
rejoin the  
Gaudis?*

2. Qaddafi

a. Could our frustrated Nasser  
make a comeback? Maybe, if Sadat fails;  
otherwise he will remain a wealthy,  
periodically dangerous nuisance.

b. He could be overthrown a la  
Ben Bella, or Sadat might get him.

3. Maghreb

a. Economically, things are looking  
up everywhere.

b. Algeria: Boumediene and crowd  
seem well entrenched, in tune with Sadat,  
on good terms with Faisal. Will they,  
and Algeria, be out front in 1980?  
Factors pro and con.

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c. Tunisia: Bourguiba's time is running out. Can his institutions survive? Does it matter? Will Tunisia affect other states?

d. Morocco: Hassan can be given no long-term guarantees, and this least Arab and most remote of the Arab countries could, give its latent discontents and real problems, blow apart as few other Arab states could.

e. Iraq. Competing with Qaddafi for trouble-making potential, but internally much less secure. What could follow a Baathi fall? Could Iraq risk war with Iran?

*Could I turn friendly in Egypt?*

## VII. The Arabs and the Super Powers

A. No important Arab leader would want to permit direct interference or dictation by any outside power. Are there circumstances which might compel such submission?

*Are there Arab interests which could be served by a close (discreet) alliance with the US - or the USSR? - What would the impact be of - 16 - exasperating the US (oil embargo) sufficiently to stimulate overt (or thinly veiled) counter attack (eg on Arab oil flow, \$ reserves etc)?*

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B. The US and the USSR still retain extremely important military, economic, and political influence in the area. The policies of each, with respect to the area and to each other, will be of great importance to developments in the Arab world. This would be true in such fields as arms supply and support to the Israelis and Arabs, encouragement or discouragement of internal Arab political changes, and the determination of policies with respect to oil consumption and pricing, among others. This element will be factored into the discussion of area leadership.

*What influences from  
other outside sources - France,  
Japan, India, Iran et al??*

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